Abstract-This work proposes a novel built-in current sensor for detecting transient faults of short and long duration as well as multiple faults in combinational and sequential logic. Unlike prior similar strategies, which are formed by pairs of PMOS and NMOS sensors, the proposed scheme is a single sensor connected to PMOS and NMOS bulks of the monitored logic. In comparison with existing transient-fault mitigation techniques, the paper presents very competitive results that indicate no performance penalty, and overheads of only 26 % in power consumption and 23 % in area.
INTRODUCTION
The continuously downscaling of technology sizes require an increasing robustness to natural aging processes or radiation environmental sources [1] . In addition to these natural phenomena, malicious fault-based attacks can be used to bypass security mechanisms of secure systems and to extract information from confidential data [2] . Both these natural or malicious phenomena on integrated circuits can induce transient effects that provoke bitflips of stored results during the system lifetime. Until the beginning of the 21 st century, researches related to mitigation of these issues were focused mostly on concurrent error detection and/or correction mechanisms to cope with soft errors induced by transient faults in memory cells. In the last decade, however, more sensitive nanotechnologies as well as the increasing demand for secure systems strongly motivated the development of countermeasures against transient faults in combinational parts of the circuits. These faults indeed can propagate up to storage elements and thus cause soft errors as well. On the other hand, if the transient fault does not induce any error due to an electrical, logical or latching-window masking effect, its detection is crucial all the same in secure applications since the fault itself reveals an attempt of attack.
Among the several strategies for detection of transient faults caused by radiation or optical sources, Bulk Built-In Current Sensors (BBICS) offer a promising solution that is perfectly suitable for system design flows based on CMOS standard cells of commercial libraries. BBICS combine the high detection efficiency of costly fault-tolerance schemes (e.g. duplication with comparison) with the low area and power overheads of less efficient mitigation techniques such as time redundancy approaches [3] [4][5] [6] . Without impacting on system operating frequency, BBICS deal with transient faults of short and long duration as well as multiple faults. Furthermore, the monitoring is done close to the zones where the faults arise. Consequently, an early detection is possible immediately after a fault occurrence, preventing induction and propagation of errors to other clock cycles or system blocks. All today's BBICS-based strategies [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] use two different circuits that monitor independently PMOS and NMOS bulk currents from pull-up and pull-down CMOS networks. In this paper, we present in section III and IV a new lowerarea BBICS scheme compounded of a single circuit that is able to monitor at the same time both CMOS networks. Before, section II discusses preliminary information regarding transient faults and built-in current sensors.
II. FUNDAMENTALS

A. Transient Faults in Integrated Circuits
Transient voltage variations during the operation of combinational or sequential circuits are defined as transient faults. The first harmful effects of transient faults are soft errors that represent the inversion of stored results from system operations (i.e. bit-flips of storage elements). In fault-tolerance-related fields, soft errors and transient faults are also known as single event upsets (SEU) and single event transients (SET).
Due to the technology scaling and the growing communication of confidential data through secure systems like smartcards, soft errors can happen today even at ground level by means of perturbation events arisen from environmental or intentional sources. Examples of environment events are alpha particles released by radioactive impurities and more importantly neutrons from cosmic rays [1] . On the other hand, intentional perturbation events are usually produced by optical sources such as flashlights or laser beams [2] that can maliciously induce transient effects on secure circuits to retrieve their secret information. Such circuit misbehaviors from fault-based attacks provide fundamental information for cryptanalysis methods that are able to break security applications.
B. BICS Detecting Transient Faults
Built-In Current Sensors (BICS) were initially proposed as a mechanism for detecting large increases in the current I DDQ consumed by a CMOS circuit during its quiescent state, i.e. when the circuit is not switching. This mechanism allows thus testing CMOS circuits against permanent faults [11] . Further, BICS were also adapted for detecting transient faults in memory cells (i.e. bit-flips) [12] [13] [14] [15] . Recently, efforts were made for monitoring transient faults in combinational logic as well [16] . All these techniques connect BICS to the power lines (V DD and GND) of the monitored circuit to distinguish anomalous transient currents from normal currents. However, in current technologies the amplitude of transient currents induced by radiation effects or fault attacks have the same order of magnitude than currents normally generated by switching activities in combinational logic circuits. Hence, schemes monitoring power lines are very limited for detecting just small range of transient faults.
To overcome this problem, the authors of [7] [17] proposed the connection of BICS to the bulks of the monitored circuit's transistors, allowing the detection of a wide range of transient faults. Fig. 1 (a) and (b) illustrate the principal idea of these socalled Bulk BICS (BBICS), which detect anomalous transient currents I fault flowing through the junction between a bulk and a reversely biased drain of a disturbed transistor (MOSFETs "off" in Fig. 1 ).
BBICS take advantage of two facts:
(1) In fault-free scenarios (i.e. I fault = 0) the bulkto-drain (or drain-to-bulk) current I B is negligible even if the MOSFET is switching due to a new input stimuli;
(2) During transient-fault scenarios, I fault is much higher than the leakage current flowing through the junction. The range of detectable transient faults is easily adjustable by calibrating the size of the transistors that constitute the BBICS.
Hence, schemes based on BBICS can be designed to latch a flag of fault indication for abnormal currents within a defined range that represents a risk of resulting in soft errors. Note in Fig. 1 that the connections between monitored circuit (e.g. inverter) and PMOS and NMOS BBICS blocks are done by using metalfrom the body-ties of each monitored transistor (i.e. transistor bulks of the inverter) up to the inputs of the BBICS circuitries. Thereby, peaks of anomalous transient currents (i.e. transient faults) are almost not attenuated [18] , ensuring thus enough current for BBICS performing an efficient detection. The only small attenuation is a function of the local distance between the struck zone of the monitored transistor and its body-tie.
III. NEW SINGLE BBICS
A. Strategy for Protecting a System
The classic BBICS-based strategy is using a pair of sensors (PMOS and NMOS) to monitor pull-up and pull-down networks -e.g. PMOS-BBICS 1 and NMOS-BBICS 1 in Fig. 2 (a) . The sensitivity of each sensor to identifying transient faults is limited for a certain number of monitored transistors. Hence the strategy is also splitting the target system into blocks with the maximum possible number of transistors the sensor is able to monitor. Fig. 2 (a) illustrates an exemplary system (chains of inverters) divided into two blocks that are monitored by two pairs of BBICS. For the same example, our proposed strategy is to use single sensors for pull-up and pulldown networks as Fig. 2 (b) shows. Consequently, the maximum amount of monitored devices can be doubled reducing the area demands of the BBICS approach. 
B. Structure of Sensor
The circuit structure of any BBICS is composed of two main parts. One is a memory element (e.g. a latch) responsible for registering a flag in case of fault. The other part is a set of transistors that constitute the input circuit of the sensor. It is connected to the metal wires coming from the bodyties of each monitored transistor. In function of the type of input circuit existing BBICS structures can be classified into two groups:
(1) Sensors [6] [7] [8] that just slightly modify the bulk capacitance of the monitored transistors by using a small input circuit connected to them; and (2) Sensors [5] [7] [9] [10] that are directly connected to the bulk via a high ohmic transistor (i.e. large channel length) in on-state with V dd or gnd, and via another low-threshold transistor (i.e large diffusion width) to recognize small transient faults.
The structure of the new Single-BBICS presented in this paper simplifies the architectures of the sensors proposed in [6] , which use a small connection circuit with NMOS and PMOS bulks, as illustrated in Fig. 3 (a) . Compared to its previous version, the new Single-BBICS (depicted in Fig. 3  (b) ) is enhanced from a pair of sensors to a single sensor and, consequently, the total number of transistors is significantly reduced. Low penalties in leakage power are achieved by finding the optimal number of monitored transistors as it will be discussed in section IV.
In Fig. 3 , W min represents the minimum diffusion width of the transistors, L min is the minimum channel length, and design factors Xn, Yn, Xp, Yp, X and Y are used for calibrating the sensor with a desired fault-detecting sensitivity. If higher values of design factors are set, the sensor is more sensitive to recognize a wider range of slighter transient faults, which require greater amplification of their voltage signals in order to be detected.
Transistors 5, 6, 7, and 8 in Fig. 3 (b) constitute the latch used to register a flag (i.e. output Flag at V dd ) in case of a transient fault within a defined range of current that temporally perturbs the monitored pull-up or pull-down network. In addition, the latch's transistors are responsible for amplifying the anomalous transient currents coming from node NMOS_Bulk or going to node PMOS_Bulk. Both these nodes are connected to the bulks of the monitored blocks. During design phase, factors X and Y allow increasing the gain of amplification and, thus, making the sensor with higher fault-detecting sensitivity. Transistors 11 and 12 are used to set the sensor in sleep-mode when the system is left on standby (i.e. signal Sleep_Mode at V dd ). During this sleep-mode any eventual offset on the bulk voltage of the monitored block is led to zero; thereby the magnitude of the threshold voltages are also slightly increased, and the subthreshold leakage power consumption is significantly reduced [6] . 
C. Mode of Operation
In fault-free conditions and inactive sleep-mode (i.e. Sleep_Mode at gnd), the proposed structure in Fig. 3 (b) has in theory NMOS_Bulk at gnd level and PMOS_Bulk at V dd . Signal Flag is at gnd; node1 at V dd ; and transistors 1, 3, 4, 10, 11, and 12 are in offstate. Further, as transistors 2 and 9 are in on-state, they impose, in reality, on NMOS_Bulk and PMOS_Bulk a small voltage drop.
In case of a transient fault in the pull-up network of the monitored block, PMOS_Bulk acts as a current sink, i.e. a transient current flows from node1 to PMOS_Bulk through transistor 9. Thereby, the voltage of node1 decreases, leading the inverter formed by transistor 6 and 5 to flip and signal Flag to change from gnd to V dd . As consequence, the other inverter (i.e. transistor 7 and 8) also switches forcing node1 to gnd even after the transient fault has ceased. Moreover, it activates transistors 10 and 1 in order to set the normal operation levels for PMOS_Bulk and NMOS_Bulk (i.e. V dd and gnd) during such a state of fault indication at Flag. As soon as this flag is processed by higher instances of the system, it must be reset (i.e. input Reset at V dd ) to be able to detect again other transient faults.
If a fault happens in the pull-down network of the monitored block, a transient current flows through transistor 2 coming from NMOS_Bulk and, consequently, the same procedure described above is performed to register an indication of fault (i.e. signal Flag from gnd to Vdd). Note that if other transient fault occurs simultaneously in pull-up network, the single BBICS is able to accomplish the memorization of a flag since the sense of the positive feedback is the same for both fault events. On the contrary, no new transient fault can be detected when a flag of fault is latched or during the reset of the sensor.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SIMULATION RESULTS
The proposed new structure named in Fig. 3 (b) as Single-BBICS-2013 was designed, analyzed, and compared with previous version labeled in Fig. 3 (a) as BBICS_MR-2012.
A. Description of Simulation Set-up
Transistor-level sensor versions were designed based on predictive 32-nm CMOS technology [19] in nominal conditions and using a V dd of 0.9 V, W min of 64 nm, and L min of 32 nm. In order to test different sensor versions, N chain of 10 inverters, such as system block 2 with N = 2 in Fig. 2 , were used as a reference circuit under protection. Therefore, either just one pair of BBICS (i.e. BBICS_MR-2012 version) or only one Single-BBICS-2013 monitors a reference circuit of N chains. All inverters of the chains were sized with minimum dimensions (i.e. Lp=Ln=L min ; Ln=W min ; and Wp=2.5·W min ).
B. Simulation of Minimum Transient-Fault Profile
We simulated a minimum transient-fault profile injecting a double exponential current source I fault on the technology's most sensitive drain node, which is the drain with the lowest capacitance -i.e. the node between two inverters sized with the minimum dimensions allowed by the technology. The parameters of I fault are set to create a minimal voltage shape able to propagate through such a technology's smallest inverter and to switch the output level of the smallest flip-flop. We identified thus the minimum profile is an I fault with duration of 50ps (measured at the half amplitude of the peak current) that generates a transient voltage amplitude of 50% of V dd on the technology's most sensitive drain. Using this case study we could verify the sensor is sufficiently sensitive to detect the smallest transient fault that can cause soft errors in the given technology. Moreover, if the sensor can detect a minimum profile, greater transient-fault profiles will be also detectable. As they will induce higher currents, the amplification task of a current sensor will be easier.
C. The Optimal Design Factors
The sensors were calibrated by using the method proposed in [6] . It allows finding, at design time and in function of factor X, the smallest factor Y that produces a sensor with the sensitivity to detecting the desired minimum transient-fault profile defined in previous subsection. In addition, we set a constraint to search the design factors: the sensors must have a response time lesser than 1 ns -i.e. they must indicate a flag at most 1 ns after the beginning of the transient fault.
Different BBICS_MR-2012 and Single-BBICS-2013 versions were created varying factor X and finding the related smallest factor Y that meets the response time constraint to monitor a reference circuit. Fig. 4 shows points representing the results of these different sensor versions. The curves present the normalized area and total power consumption (i.e. static and dynamic power consumption) in relation to the results of the reference circuit. For example, the minimum point with around 27 % of power overhead and 19% of area offset represents the costs for a reference circuit with 7 chains of 10 inverters if protected by a Single-BBICS-2013 with X=4 and Y=11. 6 . Note that all curves have such a minimum point and, thus, it is possible to determine for any reference circuit the optimal design factors.
D. The Optimal Number of Monitored Transistors
The optimal design factors, which are extracted from the minimum points of curves such as Fig. 4 illustrates, allow identifying the best trade-off between power and area and, consequently, the optimal sensor versions. We can also note in Fig. 4 that higher the number of chains is, higher the power overhead and lower the area offset of these optimal sensors are. The lower area is justified by the fact that one sensor monitors more transistors (i.e. a larger reference circuit). On the other hand, greater is the number of monitored transistors, higher is the bulk capacitance, and therefore more elevated is the offset on the bulk voltage (see Fig. 5 ) and more considerable is the leakage power consumption. Fig. 6 presents the overheads only for the optimal sensor versions as well as the power reductions whether the sleep-mode is active (i.e. system on standby). We can see again that there are minimum points on the curves for deactivated sleep-mode. Therefore, it allows finding the optimal number of monitored chains. Observe in Fig. 6 that, after 6 chains, lower the number of chains is, higher the overheads are. It is because the reference circuit has a smaller amount of transistors and the transistor counting of the sensor is kept.
Note thus that the optimal number of chains for both BBICS types is 6 with the following design factors: Xn=2, Yn=6.2, Xp=2, Yp=10.9, X=3 and Y=13.7. As the pull-up network is always larger than the pull-down network in order to compensate the slower mobility of PMOS transistors, the design factor Yp has to be greater than Yn. Hence, the design factors of Single-BICS-2013 are also greater. Further, as a single sensor is used to monitor both networks, its structure requires higher gain of amplification to balance the higher load on node1 (see Fig. 3 ). Consequently, the offset on the bulk voltage is also higher, as seen in One could argue that an offset on bulk voltage would reproduce noticeably change on threshold voltages of monitored gates and, thus, their timing characteristics would be altered. However simulation results show that the modifications in rise and fall time, and rise and fall delay of monitored inverters are negligible. Therefore, no performance penalty is observed. Otherwise, as the sub-threshold leakage current is an exponential function of the threshold voltage, the static power consumption of monitored gates is significantly increased by around 17%. If sleep mode is active, the static power overhead is 7%.
V. CONCLUSIONS With a count of only 12 transistors for monitoring PMOS and NMOS networks, the new single BBICS proposed in this work presents lower area than previous versions and similar power overhead. If designed by using 32-nm CMOS technology, the new sensor consumes lower leakage power during sleep-mode than prior circuit. Moreover, it does not require additional logic to keep, refresh, or gather the fault indications from CMOS networks. The performance of the protected circuit is not penalized.
In lower-leakage technology-based designs, the total number of transistors can be even reduced to 9 by eliminating one of the reset transistors and the sleep mode.
The workflow presented in this paper allows identifying the optimal design factors of the sensor as well as the optimal number of monitored transistors to obtain the best trade-off between area and power. Furthermore, the results show that the offset on the NMOS bulk voltage is negligible for the optimal sensor versions.
Finally, the proposed protection strategy is also useful for improving any state-of-the-art BBICS from pairs of PMOS and NMOS sensors to single sensors. Ongoing works are the fabrication of a prototype and the validation of the approach using a laser beam to inject transient faults.
